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Summary findings
Prud'homme highlights some of the dangers of  not so much whether  to decentralize in general but
decentralization:  rather what functions to decentralize --  in which sectors,
*  The benefits of decentralization in allocative  and in which regions. Guidelines can be provided on
efficiency are not as obvious as suggested by the standard  this.
theory of fiscal federalism. The assumptions of this  Often, the problem is not so much whether  a certain
theory are fragile.  service should be provided by a central, regional, or local
*  These doubt'ul  benefits might carry a cost in  government, since the  service often has to be provided
production  efficiency, but more empirical research is  with the intervention of all three levels of government.
needed on this point. What is not doubtful is that  The real challenge is how to organize the joint
decentralization runs counter to redistribution and  production  of the service.
stabilization.  Decentralization refers simultaneously to a state and to
*  Decentralization makes re.istributive  policies,  a process. The virtues and dangers of decentralization are
whether interpersonal or interjurisdictional, more  often discussed simultaneously for both concepts. This is
difficult, if not impossible.  a dange;ous confusioni because decentralization is path-
*  Decentralization also makes macroeconomic  dependent. What is desirable in a given country at a
stabilization programs more difficult to implement  certain point in time depends on the present state of
because  subnational  government  fiscal  policies can  run  decentralizatAon  and the  speed  at which  it has been
counter  to national policies. Serious drawbacks or  reached.
potential drawbacks should be considered in designing  Much more work, particularly empirical work, is
any decentralization program.  needed - in rev-ews of decentralization (or
The arguments Prud'homme develops make it easier to  centralization) experiences in general, as ovell  as those
understand some of the real choices. These choices are  encouraged or supported by the World Bank.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1  This  paper  is  not  an  attack on  decentralization, but  on  its  misunderstanding and
misapplication.  Decentralization measures have enormous potential.  They must, however,  be
properly designed and implemen.ed  if they are to increase the efficiency  of the public sector and thus
encourage growth and  improve welfare.  But decentralization measures are  like some  potent
medicines: they must be taken at the right time, in the right dose, and for the right illness to have
the desired salutary effect.  Taken improperly, they can harm rather than heal.  This paper studies
some  of  the  negative  side-effects of  uia.properly  applied  decentralization to  promote  better
understanding  of these effects and therefore wiser usage of this potentially  desirable policy.
1.2  Demand  for decentralization  is strong in most parts of the world and increased efficiency
is only one reason behind the demand.  In some countries, decentralization may be part of the
political strategy of ruling elites to retain most of their power by relinquishing  some of it.  In some
former comrnunist countries, such as Poland, however, free elections were held at the local level
before they were held at the national level in an attempt by new political forces to consolidate a still
fragile power.  Elsewhere, the demand stems from a genuine desire to introduce more democracy
in the country.  In other countries, decentralization  is not a strategy but is imposed  by the pressure
of local politicians and is conceded by national politicians.  In yet other countries, it might be a
"fashionable" idea that will satisfy the people but have little effect.  In some other countries, of
course, decentralization will be  introduced to improve the supply and delivery of  local public
services.  In most countries several reasons will combine to explain decentralization  measures.  But
in all countries these measures will have political and economic  consequences  that are hard to pred.
but are potentially important.
1.3  Tne World Bank is engaged in this decentralization movement.  A number of studies
examining decentralization  programs or policies in one or more countries have been completed in
recent years.  A partial list includes  papers on Latin America (Campbell 1991), on Venezuela  (World
Bank 1992a), on Argentina (World Bank 1990a, Herzer 1992), on Africa (Silverman 1990), on
Poland (World Bank 1992d), on the Philippines (World Bank 1992c), or on Russia (1992b).  In
addition, many of  the projects that go to the Board include a decentralization component.  For
instance, out of the seventeen transport or transport-related  projects that were examined in 1992, at
least seven, or 40 percent, had an explicit decentralization  dimension.
1.4  Despite this serious involvement, the Bank has no specific policy on the matter.  The
Bank usually favors decentralization,  but it takes this implicit stand on a weak analytical  basis.  Israel
(1992, p.76) presents decentralization  as a "competition surrogate."  In most Bank papers, the case
for decentralization  rests on the basic principles of fiscal federalism, which have been developed on
the basis of U.S.  institutions and practices a.id are not necessarily appropriate for all developing
countries.  The Bank needs to develop an analytical framework to clarify the issue, monitor the
experiences undertaken and the design of research efforts in this area, and provide better-founded
policy advice.
1.5  Being for or against decentralization  is not enough.  The following should also he clear:
why, when and how decentralization is to be encouraged (or discouraged); what trade-offs are
involved; at what speed it should proceed; in what sectors and for what functions decentralization2  On  the Dangers  of Decentralizatdon
s1  iuld be introduced  first; what specific  forms it should  take; toward  which  levels  of government
it can  most  easily  be implemented;  anti  what  precautions  or correcting  measures  should  be introduced
with  it.
1.6  This paper attempts  to give operational  content  to the concept  of decentralization. It
focusses  on only  one aspect  of decentralization,  namely  the  dangers,  or costs, associated  with  it. But
the benefits  have  probably  received  more attention  than  the costs, and  a better  understanding  of the
costs  is therefore  useful  for arriving  at balanced  views  and  effective  policy  recomrnmendations.  In the
process  that leads to the canonizatien  of even the greatest  saints, there is a devil's advocate  who
questions  the virtues  of the prospective  saint. Decentralization  must  surely  be submiitted  to this sort
of questioning.
1.7  Decentralization  is an ambiguous  concept, Its borders  not well defi.ed.  Perhaps this
ambiguity  contributes  to the appeal  of the concept.
1.8  Minis and  Rondineli  (1989)  propose  a useful  typology  that distinguishes  between  three
types  of decentralization:  spatial, me  -ket, and administrative.  Spatial  decentra;ization,  commonly
called regional policy, is defined as  a  process of  diffusing urban population  and activities
geographically  away  from  large  agglomerations.  Market  decentralization,  or economic  liberalization,
is defined  as a process  of creating  conditions  in which  goods  and services  are provided  by marker
mechanisms  rather than by government  decision. Administrative  decentralization  is defined  as the
'transfer of responsibility  for  planning,  management,  and  the raising  and  allocation  of resources  from
the central  government  and its agencies  to field  units of government  agencies,  subordinate  units or
levels of government,  semi-autonomous  public  authorities  or corporations  area-wide,  regional  or
functional  authorities,  or nongovernmental  private  or voluntary  organization"  (Rondinelli  and Nellis
1986,  p.5).
1.9  Administrative  decentralization,  when so defined,  can be subdivided  into three types:
deconcentration,  delegation,  and  devolution.  Deconcentration  is  the redistribution  of decision  making
among  different  levels within  the central  government.  Delegation  is the transfer  of responsiblities
and  power  from the  central  government  to semi-autonomous  organizations  (like  a public  corporation
or a housing  authority)  not wholly  controlled  by the central  government  but ultimately  accountable
to it. Devolution  is the transfer  of powers  from the central  gcvernment  to independent  subnational
governments.
1.10  Unfortunately,  this typology does not seem to  have taken hold, and  the word
"decentralization"  is commonly  used to refer to what  is described  above  as devolution.  This paper
follows  that usage.  In addition,  it uses the words "deconcentration"  and 'delegation" as defined
above.
1.11  Defining "decentralization"  as the transfer of powers from central government  to
independent  subnational  governments  inmnediately  raises  a number  of questions  about  the notions  of
transfer,  independent  subnational  governments  and powers.
1.12  First, the notion of  transfer can refer to a  process or  to  a state.  In principle,
decentralization  should be used to describe the process by which a  decentralized  system of
government  replaces  a centralized  system. In practice,  it is often used to describe  the state thatOn  the  DanSgrs  of Ducentralizaion  3
results  from this process, that is a decentralized  system. The literature  on fiscal decentralization,
for instance,  deals with the merits  (or demerits)  of a decentralized  system,  and, to most people,  an
"optimal  rate of decentralization"  would  evoke the desirable  state of national  versus subnational
governments  in balance  rather than the desirable  speed  to attain that ideal state.  This ambiguity
suggests  that one meaning  of the term should  not be divorced  fiom the other, and that we should
look  joir,tly  Pt  the st, e of decentralization  and at the  prre^ess  by which  it can be reached. This  paper
will use the word '`tlecentralization"  in its static  as well  as in its dynamic  setnse.
Decentralzation to Whom?
1.13  Second,  the  definition  of decentralization  implies  the  existence  of independent  subnational
governments.  The notion  of an independent  subnational  government  is by no means  clear.  At one
end of the spectrum,  there  are truly  independent  subnational  governments  that are under  the control
of locally  elected councils  and/or mnayors,  and hold views and carr;  out policies  that can be in
complete  disagreement  with those  of the  central  government.  At th. other end of the spectrum,  are
subnational  governments  that are mere  creatures  of the central  government,  with mayors  appointed
and fired by it.  They  are simply  the subnational  ha  ads of the nadonal  administration  and their task
is to carry out the policies  of the central government. Only the first case example describes
decentralization.  The second  case, there  could  only be deconcentration.
1.14  Reality is  always more complicated.  Subnational  goverm-nents  are  never total
independent  of some  form  of higher  levels  of government.  Subnational  goverrnents  fall somewhere
on the spectrum  between  the two  polar  scenarios  and  can  have  elected  councils  and  appointed  mayors
at the same  time or act simultaneously  as autonomous  units and agents  of the central  government.
Independence  of subnational  governrments  is a matter  of more  or less rather than  of yes or no.  In
one-party  states,  for example  in the  former  communist  countries,  local  government  olficials  are either
appointed  by the top or elected  on top-controlled  tickets  and therefore  belong  to the party in power.
In addition, the resources  of the subnational  governments  are usually subj^ct to strict national
control.  To that end, former  communist  countries  adhered  to basic theoretical  "principles"-the
principle  of the unity  of the state, and  the principle  of the unity  of the state  budget. Decentralization
could  hardly  exist  in such  a setting. In practice,  matters  are often  more  complex. People  appointed
from above often  have  local origins. They serve  both as spokespersons  of the local people  to the
national  ruler  and as spokespersons  of the national  ruler to the local  people. Giving  them  additional
power is often more than deconcentration. Even in developed  countries, mixed entities serve
simnultaneously  as arms of a central  government  and  as full-fledged  local goverrnents. Ttt  French
dOpartement,  until recently, was a case in point.  It had most of the features  of an independent
subnational  government,  with a locally  elected  ',:uncil, that freely elected  a president  and voted a
budget.  However, in every dipartement,  a central govermnent  appointed  prefect chaired the
me¢tings  of the departmental  council,  prepared  the budget,  and controlled  its execution  by central
government  appointed  civil servants. Similar  complex  arrangements  are found  today  in Turkey  and
the Czech  Republic. Words  like quasi-local  governments  or pseudo  local  governments  would  have
to be developed  to fully describe the realities of central/local  relationships. The notion of an
independent  subnational  government  is a relative  concept.4  On the  Dangers of Decentralization
Decentralization  of What?
1.15  Third,  the  3tion  of  powers  given  to  the  central  government  and  the  subnational
governments  is inultidiniensional.  The two most common dimensions are taxation and expenditures.
The most frequently  used indicators of the state of decentralization  are the tax decentralization  ratio
(subnational government  axes relative to total government taxes) and the expenditure decentralization
ratio (subnational  governmen,  expenditures  relative  to total government  expenditures).
1.16  In addition  to the  nower  to spend and  the power  to  tax,  other  important attributes  of
sovereignty are the power . ' i 0rrow  and the power to regulate.  The power to contract,  or the power
to change.  or the power  to ovjn, can be seen as combinations of the four basic attributes  mentioned.
1.17  The  powers  to  tax  and  to  spend  are  full  of  ambiguities.  Expenditures  and  tax
decentralization  ratios are equally hard to define because the notions of subnational expenditures  and
subnational  taxes  are not clear.
1.18  Take expenditures  decentralization.  Not all expenditures by local governments  are fully
controlled  by  local governments.  In man!  countries,  the visible hand of the central  government  is
dictating,  controlling,  influencing,  or  restricting  Ci.e freedom  of  local  governments  in  their
expenditures  behavior.  Establishing  a  typology  of these  manifold  constraints  would  be  a useful
exercise  (see W-rld  Bank  1992b for a first  attempt  at  listing discretion-reducing  practices  utilized
in Russia).
1.19  Another  useful  exercise  would  be  to  estimate  what  could  be  called  a  "discretion
coefficient."  The  "apparrnt"  expenditure  decentralization  ratio (i.e.,  the one most  often used and
quoted) would be multiplied by the coefficient to arrive at a "true" expenditure decentralization  ratio.
France,  for  instance,  is much  less centralized  today  than  it was  15 years  ago.  But  the change  is
poorly  reflected  by the evolution of expenditures  decentralization  ratios  that may have moved  from
16  percent  to  19  percent.  A  better  assessment  of  what  happened  would  be  to  say  that
decentralization  in  France  increased  from  9.6  percent  to  17.1 percent.  Similarly,  in comparing
France  and Italy today,  it is customary  to quote  the apparent  rates  of expenditure  decentralization,
which  are  19  percent  and  30  percent  respectively,  and  to  conclude  that  Italy  is  much  more
decentralized  than France.  But it can be argued that the discretion coefil-ient  is 90 percent in France
and  only 50  percent  in Italy,  and  that the true expenditure  decentralization  ratios  are  respectively
17.1 percent  and  15 percent,  so that Italy is less decentralized  than France.
1.20  A similar story  can be told about tax decentralization  ratios.  At least five criteria can be
use,d to define the "localness"  of a tax: (1) who chooses the tax base;  (2) who assesses  the tax base;
j3) who decides  the rate(s)  of the tax; (4) who collects the tax; and (5) who gets the proceeds  of the
tax.  If the answer  to these f;ve questions  is the subnational  government,  then no doubt the tax is a
local tax.  But this  is rarely  the case.  Although  there is no general agreement  on  this issue,  nany
people would agree  that the third criterion,  rate setting, and of co} rse the fifth, allocation,  are more
important  than others.  If only  taxes,  the rates  of which  are decided  freely  by  local goverunents,
were  considered  local taxes,  tax decentralization  ratios published  in many international  documents
would decline  significantly.  In particular,  the subnational share of "shared  taxes" (taxes with rates
decided by national governments,  such as the German income tax for instance) would be considered
transfers,  not local taxes.  Even this criterion would be difficult to apply.  In some countries,  where(In the  Dangers  of Decentralization  5
local governrrents are free to set certain taxes, they all chose the same rate because either they
follow ministry of finance "guidelines" or they all hit a low ceiling imposed by the ministry.
1.21  Another difficollty  with tax and expenditure decentralization  ratios is associated with the
role and the weight of government "satellites." The satellites are often important in many countL  Aes,
particularly at the lacal level, but vary greatly from country to countiy and over time.  In certain
countries or cities, such local public services as water, public transportation, and public housing are
provided directly by  local governments, and related income and expenditures appear in  local
governments' accounts; in  other countries or cities,  ecactly  the same services are provided by
government-controlled  entities  (such  as utilities, concessionaires)  and reiated  income and expenditures
do not appear in local government statistics  The same reality  is reflected in different measures of
decentralization.  Another example of this bias in many fornmer  socialist countrie; is local public
services that were provided by central governrn it-controlled satellites andi  have now been shifted
to local government-controlled  satellites.  This significant increase in decentralization will not be
reflected in current measures of decentralization.
1.22  These examples  illustrate the many dimensions  of decentralization  and show the difficulty
of  producing simple estimates of  complex realities.  Thus,  publishcd expenditures and  tax
decentralization  ratios based on local government accounts can deviate from true ratios, often by a
very large margin, and one that differs over tirme  and space.  This limits the usefulness of studies
that try to establish a link-often  considered a causal link between the degree of tax o. expenditure
decentralization  and some economic magnitude, such as the total size of government (verifying the
Leviathan hypothesis), or the level of development, or even economic growtth  (Reid and Winkler,
1991).
1.23  This paper will attempt to describe and analyze some of the dangers associated with
decentralization. Most of the analysis will refer to the "pure" decentralization  of fiscal federalism
theory, that is, a system in which pure subnational  govcrnments  raise pure local taxes and undertake
pure local expenditures, without the benefit of central government transfers.  This is not a very
realistic model, but it is the one used in the pro-decentralization  theury, and it is useful for analytical
purposes.  In clr.ssical Musgravian fashion, the paper will examine the dangers of decentralization
from the successive viewpoints If allocation (section 2), redistribution (section 3), and stabilization
(section 4).  The paper will then try  to  relax some  of  the questionable assumptions of  the
decentralization  model to go beyond the centralization-decentralization  dichotomy (section 5).On the Dangers of Decentralization
2
DECENTRALIZATION  CAN  UNDERMINE  EFFICIENCY
2.1  The case for decentralization  is usually based on efficiency. The uieory of fiscal
federalism  argues that tastes of  inhabitants  differ between jurisdiciions.  People under lOCdl
governuent  A preter recreatio.. people  under local government  B prefer education. The central
government's  generalized  provision  for education  and recreation  will satisfy neither.  But the
decentralized  allocation  of resources  will better  match  demand  and will therefore  increase  welfare.
2.2  This can be represented  grapliicall,  by figure  2. 1, in which  i and  j  are the per capita
quantities  of the two local goods  to be provided. LM is a budget  constraint  showing  the quantities
of . and  J that  can be produced.  A and  B are (families  of) indifference  cu,ves for local governments
A and B,  respectively. In a decentralized  system, local government  A will settle at point a
(producing  ia and ia)  o.n indifference  curve A; and local goverrunent  B will settle at b,  on
indifference  curve 8.  In a centralized  eysterm,  central  government  will settle  in c, on indifference
curves A'  and B'.  A'  and B' are indifference  curvev  inferior  to indifference  curves A and B.
Centralized  provision  therefore  implies  a welfare  loss.
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2.3  Exactly  the same reasoning  can be conducted  with i representing  total spending  on
publicly  provided  goods  (that  is taxes)  andj iepresenting  privately  produced,  and paid for, goods.
A decentralized  system  will  be welfare-enhanc-Lg  because  it will  better  suit  the various  public-private
preferences  of dhe  various  jurisdictions.
2.4  This model,  however,  can be criticized  on two grounds. First, it assumes  a number  of
hypotheses  that are unlikely  to be met in a developing  country.  Second,  it focusses  entirely on
demand  effciency, and ignores  supply  efficiency.
Decentr:ization and Allocative  EMciency
2.5  Most  of the explicit  or implicit  assumptions  of the fiscal federalism  model  are not met
in developing  countries. First, the  model  assumes  that  the main  difference  between  the various  local
or regional  jurisdictions  is in their respective  tastes  or preferences. In reality,  the main  differences
are in income,  either in household  incomes,  which explain  differences  in tastes, or potential  tax
incomes.  In most developing  countries the pioblem is not to reveal the fine differences  in
preferences  between  jur.sdictions  but to satisfy  the basic  needs,  which  are, at!  least  in orirriple, well
known,  and need nct be revealed. The potential  welfare  gains  associated  with a betwr match  of
supply  and demand  are not large.
2.6  Second,  the  model  assumes  that  the  taxpayers/vi  ters  of each  jurisdiction  will  express  their
preferences  in their votes.  This hypothesis  bears little relationship  to local electoral  behavior  in
developing  countries. Preferences  are complex  and manifold. They  relate  to the importance  of ;he
local public  sector output  (that is, the total amount  of local taxes  paid) and to the structure  of this
output,  to the set  of regulations  that  will  be locally  imposed,  to the supply  efficiency  that is expected,
to the distributional  implications  of the tax-expenditure  package  that  will be decided. How  could  all
that  be expi ,;sed  in a single  vote? Local  elections,  when  they  exist,  are usually  decided  on the basis
of personal  loyalties  or of political  party loyalties. People  vote for a mayor they know  or a party
they like. This is true even in developed  countries,  where  local elections  are often a rehearsal  for
national  elections  and often do not reflect local preferences. In addition,  the platforms  on which
local elections  are fought  'when they  exist)  are often  vague  and/or  unrealistic. The menus  offered
for choice to the electorate  are unlikely  to be a good vehicle  for expression  of the electorate's
preferences.
2.7  A third hypothesis,  that locally  elected  mayors  will satisfy the revealed  preferences  is
rarely realized  for several  reasons. In most  cases,  as mentioned,  the  electoral  mandate  is structurally
vague  or inconsistent.  Even if mayors  wanted  to fulfill it, they  usually  could not do it because  of
a gross  mismatch  between  available  resources  and  promised  expenditures.  Then,  mayors  often  lack
incentives  to seep their promises. Some  will not run for re-election,  and most know  that their re-
election kvil depend little on their local performance. A "good" mayor, who has guessed the
preferences  of his electorate  and tried to respond  to it, may  well  be ousted  because  he belongs  to a
party whose  national  policies  have  become  unpopular.
2.8  Finally,  even  if mayors  wanted  to satisfy  the  preferences  of the  electorate  and  had  enough
resources  to do so (two heroic assumptions!)  it is not sure that their local bureaucracies  would
follow. A mayor  is merely  a principal  who  gives  orders  to a local  bureaucrat,  his agent. The  degrce
of control  of the principal  over his agent,  the  modalities  of this  control,  and its efficiency,  will vary8  On the  Dangers  of Decentralization
from country to country.  But in many cases, local bureaucracies are often unresponsive. They are
poorly motivated, occasionally poorly qualified, and they might have good reasons to pursue their
own agenda rather than the agenda of their principal.
2.9  The hypotheses on which the decentralization model rests therefore appear fragile,
particularly (but not exclusively) in developing countries.  Yet, they are essential to the conclusion
that decentralization will improve allocative efficiency.  Of course,  it can be  argued that  the
mechanisms which have proven to  work imperfectly for decentralization do not work at all for
centralization.  This view is only partly true.  Central provision of local public services can also be
modulated to better suit local demand.  There is no compelling reason why central government
provision would be uniform over space, as is postulated in theor%  and in figure 2.1.  Higher level
governments might differentiate the services they provide according to  space, just  as  private
enterprises operating on a national or international  scale have done for centuries. It is true that there
is no formal electoral mechanism  to ensure adaptation  to local needs in the case of central provision.
But there might be other mechanisms, such as the will to serve people, deconcentration, pricing
mechanisms, survey devices.  These alternative  mechanisms  might be as efficient (or as inefficient)
as  the electoral mechanism implied in decentralization.  On the whole, the potential gains in
allocative  efficiency  resulting from decentralization  are likely to be small. This finding  is particularly
important in  view of  what can be  said about the impact of  decentralization upon productive
efficiency.
Decentralization and Production Efficiency
2.10  The standard decentralization  model says nothing, or next to nothing, about production
efficiency.  The welfare gains to be obtained from decentralization  (if one believes the model) will
accrue only because supply will better match demand.  There is a hidden assumption here, that
supplv itself is always efficient.  This assumption, derived from consideration  of the private s,ctor
(where it does not always hold), is not acceptable  for the public sector.  Kranton (1990) and Heggie
(1991) make this impertant point in their critique of marginal cost pricing practices.  A real issue
is whether local provision is more cost effective  than national  provision. We cannot, and should not,
take for granted that we always operate on the production frontier, or re.erring to figure 2. 1, that
line LM is a given. The shift from centralization  to decentralization  may well imply a shift from LM
to L'M',  with L'M'  being either to the left or to the right of LM.  In fact, this could be the real
question, and the impacts of  the two different regimes are much more important in terms of
productive  efficiency than  in  terms  of  allocative efficiency.  As  shown  in  figure  2.2,  if
decentralization  resulted in a downward shift of LM to L'M',  even if we assume that centralization
was unable to differentiate  between A and B, then decentralization  will result in A consuming  a'  and
B consuming b',  which represents a welfare loss relative to the situation in which they were both
consuming c.
2.11  Whether decentralization will increase or  decrease productive efficiency (move LM
tupwards  or downwards) is a matter of empirical studies.  Not much information is available or, the
subject, but several a priori reasons suggest why one should fear that decentralization  will decrease
productive efficiency.On the  Dangers  of Decentralization  9






2.12  One reason is that the provision of a given local public service could include economies
of scale.  This point is widely recognized  in the literature, and even the most decided decentralists
acknowledge  that services with economies  of scale should  not be decentralized. Studies of economies
of scale in local public services are scarce, but the prevailing view is that few local public services
involve economies of scale implying nationwide supply.  For most  local public services, the
provision in a given city is independent  of the provision in other cities.  The welfare losses implied
by decentralization  because of economies of scale are probably minimal.
2.13  Another, more compelling, reason is that economies  of scope might exist and that central
bureaucracies may be more efficient than local bureaucracies.  Decentralization not only transfers
power from central to  local government, but also from central to local bureaucracies.  Some
indicators show  that  central  bureaucracies are  likely  to  operate relatively  closer  than  local
bureaucracies to the technical production frontier.  For one thing, central government bureaucracies
are likely to attract more qualified people, not so much because they offer higher salaries, but
because they offer better careers, with a greater diversity of tasks, more possibilities of promotion,
less  political  intervention, and  a  longer view  of  issues.  Furthermore,  central  government
bureaucracies invest more in technology, research, development, promotion, and innovation.  Only
large institutions can do this in the public sector, just as in the private sector.  In many developing
countries not enough of these investmnents  are made by central goverrment bureaucracies; but then,
local bureaucracies make almost none.10  On  the  Dangers  of Decentralization
2.14  The problem is compounded  by the progress of privatization. In most countries, and for
good reasons, the border line between private and public sector provision is being shifted.  The
sphere of public provision is therefore shrinking.  Decentralization  shifts the border line between
central and local public provision, and it also reduces the share of the former.  As a result, the role
of central govermnent activities and bureaucracies is rapidly being curtailed.  This retrenchment is
probably done at a cost that may well be high.  The best people leave, morale is lowered, the sense
of public service is shaken, networks are broken, investments in research and development are
sacrificed. The examples of France and Brazil would probably support this pessimistic assessment.
In France, the prestigious and efficient corps of Ing6nieurs  des Ponts et Chauss6es, which has been
the driving force behind most infrastructure provision in France, is presently loosing its strength,
largely as a result of decentralization.  In Brazil, for much the same reason, the highly qualified
corps of road engineers and sanitary engineers, which existed at the national level, is also being
partly dismantled.  The obvious costs associated with this loss of technology and expertise are
probably not compensated by potential progress made in the private sector or in local government
bureaucracies.
2.15  Whether these retrenchment costs are related to the size of the central public sector
(because it goes below an unknown threshold), or to the speed at which the process takes place, is
important, however, for policy prescription. If retrenchment  costs are a matter of absolute size, then
decentralization could be pushed more strongly in large countries than in small ones.  This obvious
point is completely ignored in the standard analytical  approach.  If, on the other hand, retrenchment
costs are a function of the speed at which decentralization proceeds, they could be minimized or
perhaps eliminated by a slower process.
2.16  A number of case studies of actual decentralization  measures have expressed fears that
decentralization  might undermine efficiency. Thus, for instance, a recent World Bank document on
Peru, looking at the water supply  and sanitation  sector, states, "The regionalization  process underway
and the corresponding changes in sector organization assign all the operational responsibilities to
regional and  local governments.  In general, this is a desirable trend as it brings the level of
responsibility closer to the users.  A great challenge, however, is being placed on these levels of
government to  create  the  necessary institutions to  respond effectively to  local  needs.  The
management of  services in more than 400 urban centers of less then 100,000 inhabitants is of
particular concern.  These towns do not benefit from economies of scale in operations, and are
unable to offer attractive working conditions and salaries to qualified  personnel and to plan and run
water and sanitation operations at a satisfactory level....  In the next two or three years, it is likely
that response capacity of the new sector will be even worse than it is today as new institutions need
time and assistance to develop this capacity" (World Bank 1990b, pp.xi-xii).
Decentralization  and  Corruption
2. 17  Another reason that decentralization  might not be desirable in terms of efficiency  and that
has  to  do  with  both  allocative and  production efficiency,  is  that  decentralization might be
accompanied by corruption.  The corruption would probably be more widespread  at the local level
than at the national level.  But if true, decentralization  would automatically  increase the overall level
of corruption in a given country.  This, by the way, might not be bad in terms of redistribution,
because the benefits of decentralized corruption are probably better distributed than the benefits of
centralized corruption.  Corruption is costly in terms of allocative efficiency because it leads to aOn the  Dangers  of Decentralizition  11
supply of services for which kickbacks  are higher rather than to those for which there is a demand.
It is also costly in terms of production efficiency because it leads to corruption-avoiding  strategies
that increase costs, favor ineffec' ve technologies,  and waste time.
2.18  Corruption is hard to assess and measure, but several reasons can be given for greater
corruption at the local level than at the national level.  On one hand,  more opportunities for
corruption probably exist at the local level.  Local politicians and bureaucrats are likely to be more
subject to pressing demands from local interest groups (whose money and votes count) in matters
such as taxation or authorizations. They also usually have more discretion than national decision-
makers. In fact, this discretion is the major theoretical  advantage  of decentralization. That national
bureaucrats, at least in some countries, are moved from place to place makes it more difficult for
them to establish  unethical  relationships  with local interest groups, unlike local bureaucrats who make
their careers in the same location.
2.19  On the other hand, fewer obstacles to corrmption  exist at the local level  i  !Dtion  in
many cases requires the cooperation  of both politicians and bureaucrats, and the disti.  ui between
them is generally less rigorous at the local level.  Local bureaucrats have less indep.,A.tc_  c ce:tive
to local politicians than national bureaucrats do relative to national  politicians. In sor.  -.tries at
least, national bureaucracies have a tradition of honesty which is often absent at t.e -,  -a1 level.
Monitoring  and auditing are usually  better developed  at the national  level than at the loca. ke,  . The
pressure of the media would also be greater for national corruption than for local corruption.
2.20  Few, if any, empirical studies have been done on the matter. Prud'homme (1992), found
informal taxation (defined as the "nonformal means utilized to finance the provision of public goods
and services") at the local level in Zaire to be at least eight times more important than the formal
taxation recorded in the books of local governments.  Informal taxation includes pinch, extortions
and requisitions  (public informal taxes), but also contributions, gifts and donations (private informal
taxes).  The study did not attempt to estimate similar figures for national informal taxation, but they
would probably not have the same relative magnitude.  This study supports the idea that more
corruption exists at the local level than at the national level.  Widespread agreement could be found
in France or in Italy that local level corruption is more significant than national level corruption.
Virtually all the cases of corruption that have been identified in these countries in recent years are
local-government  related.  For the reasons suggested, locally elected politicians, in cooperation with
politically  appointed  local  bureaucrats,  found  it  easy  to  extract  money  for  granting  local
authorizations  or of local procurement contracts.
2.21  The issue of corruption only reinforces the point that, from an efficiency viewpoint,
decentralization  is not always beneficial and that it can be dangerous.  These a priori considerations
should be supported  by empirical studies of decentralization  or centralization experiences. One such
study, on water collection and treatment in Tunisia, can be found in Khellaf (1992).
A Case Study of Centralization  in Tunisia
2.22  Sewage services in Tunisia provide a successful  example of centralization.  Until 1974,
used water collection and treatment was the responsibility of local governments.  The level of
technical expertise was very low.  In  1974, a sample survey of people employed in the sector
revealed that only about 4 percent of them had any skills related to sewage, and practically all of12  On  the Dangers  of Decentralization
them were attached to the municipality of Tunis.  The service was provided directly, by force
account, with no accounting information on costs and no form of cost recovery.  Service quantity
and quality were bad.  In  1970, only 20 out of  150 municipalities had some form of  sewage
treatment,  and what there  was, was inefficient.  Only eight municipalities had  some form of
treatment plants, but all were overloaded and malfunctioning.  Many of the sewer systems were
poorly designed and/or poorly maintained.  More than half of the sewer accessories, such as
manholes and grit-traps, were out of service.  Out of 27 lift-stations  that were visited by a World
Bank team in 1974, only 5 were functioning. The implications  were serious.  The Lake of Tunis,
into which used  water was discharged with little or  no  treatment, was eutrophysing rapidly.
Inf_ctious  and parasitic diseases were prevalent.  Some cases of cholera were reported in the early
1970s.  Something had to be done.
2.23  Instead of trying to help local governments  deal with the problem, the cental government
of Tunisia decided to take the provision of service from local governments and entrust it to a
specialized parastatal agency, ONAS (the Office National del'Assainissement), created for that
purpose in 1974.  The World Bank was instrumental in this decision and played a significant role
in the development of ONAS.  ONAS was given a monopoly position over the service, first in the
Tunis metropolitan area, then gradually in all other major urban centers of the country.  In other
parts 3f Tunisia, municipalities  continue to operate their own system (if any), some of which will
eventually be  integrated into ONAS's  operations.  From the outset, the emphasis was put  on
autonomous management, appropriate personnel policy, and sound financial procedures.
2.24  By most accounts, this centralization has been successful.  ONAS developed into an
effective and efficient institution. The training programs that started in 1978 have been particularly
important. By 1987, 23 percent of the personnel  were technical professionals  (not counting  6 percent
who were managers), and all of the foreign assistants had been replaced by corrmetent,  well-trained
Tunisians.  Even though the central government continues to provide important subsidies to the
sector, a  surcharge on water consumption covers most operating costs, investment costs of the
network are partly recovered by a form of property tax, and individual  connection  costs are entirely
recovered from the beneficiaries.  ONAS benefitted from imnportant  loans by the World Bank and
other donors. The level of sewage services increased significantly  in Tunisia. By 1988, ONAS was
providing full sewage services to the 30 largest cities, accounting  for about 50 percent of the urban
population of Tunisia, which had been growing rapidly in the 1975-1988  period.
2.25  It might be unfair to compare the success  of this centralized  provision of sewage services
with the failure of the decentralization provision that preceded and to attribute the difference to
centralization.  The important resources that were mobilized, both dornestically  and internationally,
and allocated to the sector played a key role.  But there are strong reasons to believe that these
resources could not have been mobilized under a decentralized system, and that, had they been
mobilized, they would not have been utilized so efficiently. The successful training that took place
would have been much more difficult to conduct in 30 different municipalities, and the need for
trained personnel would have been greater.  Reforming the accounting and fruancial procedures,
which did not prove easy at the level of ONAS, would have been impossible if it had been attempted
in 30 different municipalities. In other words, because resources would have been less efficiently
utilized under a decentralized regime, they would not have been forthcoming under such a regime.
In terms of production (or supply) efficiency, the centralization of sewage services in Tunisia was
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2.26  Was this done at a cost in terms of allocative (demand)  efficiency?  ONAS has not yet
provided sewage services in all parts of the country, and some smaller cities rightly complain that
they have not benefitted  much from the system. ONAS' answer is that it focused on the larger cities,
where needs were greater or more urgent.  Had the samne  resources been spread more evenly over
the country (assuming equal supply efficiency), the benefits of sanitation, measured in terms of
sanitary hazards avoided, would probably have been reduced.  Had the previous, decentralized
system prevailed, it is even more likely that these smaller cities would not have been better off in
terms of sanitation.
2.27  The real cost,  if any,  of this experiment in centralization is elsewhere, outside the
sanitation sector.  The creation of ONAS weakened already weak local governments.  Depriving
municipalities  of one of their natural responsibilities  made it more difficult for them to change, to
learn, to grow, to improve.  As a result, they are perhaps providing less efficiently other services,
such as garbage collection or physical planning.14  On the Dangers of Decentralization
3
DECENTRALIZATION  CAN  INCREASE  DISPARiTEES
3.1  Decentralization should also be examined in terms of redistribution. Equity, one of the
main objectives of  public finance, can refer to  two types of  income redistribution issues: (1)
interpersonal redistribution, and (2) interjurisdictional redistribution.  Both can be  impacted by
decentralization.
Interpersonal Redistribution
3.2  Interpersonal redistribution or  equity can be adversely affected by decentralization.
Public finance literature states that redistribution  (which  implicitly  means  interpersonal  redistribution)
should remain a central government responsibility for two reasons.
3.3  One reason is decentralized  attempts  at redressing income redistribution  patterns are likely
to  be  unfair,  as  illustrated by  the following example.  Consider a  country consisting of  six
households (A, B, C, D, E, F) regrouped in two regions: region Rich, regrouping A, B, and C; and
region Poor regrouping D, E, and F.  Interpersonal income redistribution  can be done at the central
government level or at the regional level, as indicated in table 3.1.
Table 3.1:  Interpersonal Income Redistribution  Compared  at National and at Regional Levels
Households  Rich  Poor
A  B  C  D  E  F
Incomne  before distribution  10  8  6  6  4  2
Redistribution  at the central  level
Taxes and subsidies  -2  -I  0  0  + 1  +2
Incorne  after redistribution  8  7  6  6  5  4
Redistribution  at the regional  level
Taxes and subsidies  -1  0  + I  -1  0  + I
Income after redistribution  9  8  7  5  4  3
3.4  This example highlights two important points.  One is that decentralized redistribution
is likely to lead to different treatment of equal? in a country.  Househo,ds C and D, which had the
same income (6) before redistribution, now have different incomes (7 for C, and 5 for D).  The
unequal treatment of equals is a definition of unfairness.  Note that this might happen even if region
Rich and region Poor have the same redistributive functions.  In the example given, it takes place
because Rich and Poor have different income distributions.  But a similar unfair results would be
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policies. When  different  regions  have  at the same  time  different  income  distributions  and different
redistributions  policies-which  is more likely-the outcome  can become  more  erratic and unfair.
3.5  The other conclusion from table 3.1  is  that decentralized  redistribution is  less
redistributive  than centralized  redistribution. The maximum/minimum  ratio, which is 5 before
redistribution,  is reduced to  3 by decentralized  redistribution  as opposed to 2 by centralized
redistribution.  This  happens  because  average  incomes  are higher  in region  Rich  than  in region Poor.
This, by itself, does not mean that centralized  redistribution  is better.  But it means that, if an
effective  redistribution  is a policy  objective,  it will  be more  easily  achieved  by a centralized  system.
3.6  A second reason for centralized  redistribution  is more compelling,  as decentralized
redistribution  is self-defeating.  Consider  a political  jurisdiction  that  undertakes  active  redistributive
policies,  imposing  high  taxes  on the rich and  providing  high benefits  to the  poor. The rich from  this
jurisdiction  will tend to move out.  Our generous  jurisdiction  will soon be unable to sustain its
policy.
3.7  Thus  interpersonal -d,stribution should primarily be  conducted by  the  central
government.  For the central  government  to conduct  strong  redistributive  policies,  it has to control
a significant  share of taxes  and public  expenditure. Centralization  is not a sufficient  condition  of
redistribution,  as there  are many  centralized  countries  with little  or no redistribution. However,  it
is a necessary  condition,  for it is hard to think  of a country  with important  redistribution  carried  out
a subnational  levels.  Decentralization  therefore  makes it more difficult  to pursue interpersonal
redistributive  policies.
Interjurisdictional  Redistribution
3.8  Redistribution,  however,  can take place  between  places  (or jurisdictions  or regions  or
communes)  as well as between  people. This is not widely  considered  in the literature  of fiscal
federalism.  First, interjurisdictional  disparities  are rarely  recognized.  They  are considered  abnormal
phenomena,  resulting  from accidental  shocks  that will not last because  they will be automatically
reduced  and eliminated  by movements  of goods, capital,  and labor.  Second,  if interjurisdictional
disparities  persist, interpersonal  disparities  should  be corrected  by policies. A poor  person  is a poor
person  and should  be aided  irrespective  of where  the person  happens  to live. Transfers  given  to low
income  areas  are not guaranteed  to benefit  the  poorer  citizens  of these  areas. Reducing  interpersonal
income  disparities  will automatically  achieve  a reduction  in interspatial  disparities  as well.  These
arguments  are not convincing.
3.9  First, large interjurisdictional  disparities  exist in most countries. They  do not disappear
as predicted  by standard  economic  theory. These disparities  are particularly  wide in developing
countries. The belief  was long held  that they  increased  in the first phase  of economic  development
and decreased  in a second  phase, according  to the Williamson  law (Williamson  1965). This view
has been  challenged (Krugman,  1987,  Myrdal,  1957,  and Kaldor,  1970)  and also contradicted  by
recent  trends  observed  in several  industrial  countries,  where  interregional  disparities  have increased
in the late 1980's-leading  to an unexpected  upturn  of the Williamson  curve. Interspatial  disparities
are present  and can increase.16  On the Dangers  of Decentralization
3.10  Second, a reduction of interpersonal disparities does not necessarily lead to a reduction
in interspatial disparities.  If the lower income region has a more equal income distribution than the
higher income region, then transfers to the poorer citizens might well benefit primarily the richer
region, increasing interregional disparities.
3.11  Third, a low income region is not only an area where there are low income people.  It
is also a place where there are less economic opportunities, less infrastructure, less agglomeration
economies and other locational externalities.  Increasing individual incomes in the area is not the
same thing as increasing the developme  it potential of the area.
3.12  Fourth, jurisdictions are social and political entities.  They exist beyond the individuals
that compose them, in the minds of these individuals. In their utility functions, the citizens of one
region enter nct only their own income, but also the income of their fellow citizens, more than the
income of inhabitants  of other regions.  Interregional disparities are not merely statistical artifacts;
their perception is a sociological  reality. As a result, there is a political demand for action to reduce
interjurisdictional disparities.
3.13  A decentralized  system is therefore not likely to reduce interjurisdictional  disparities more
than a centralized system.  A decentralized system in which all taxes would be collected and all
expenditures undertaken on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis would not  redistribute revenues
between  jurisdictions.  By contrast, a centralized  system will almost always redistribute  income from
a richer jurisdiction to a poorer jurisdiction. This will occur even with a proportional or regressivie
tax system coupled with a regressive expenditure system (a system in which per capita expenditures
or per capita benefits associated  expenditures  increase as per capita income increases). This apparent
paradox can be illustrated analytically and empirically.
3.14  Annex I presents a simple model of budget-induced  transfers.  The model shows that
there are only three main avenues to increase spatial transfers in a given country: (I)  increase the
size of the central budget, (2) increase the equalizing nature of budgetary expenditures, or (3)
increase the progressiveness of taxes.  Figure 3.1 is a graphical presentation  of this mechanism.
Figure 3.1.  Budget-Indu-e! Transfers
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3.15  Figure 3.1 presents  a budget  financed  by taxes proportional  to income. The amounv
contributed  by a region, on a per capita  basis, is a simple  function  of income. Expenditures  '
region,  always  on a per capita  basis, are assumed  to be independent  of income. It follows  that poor
regions  get more from  the budget  than  they  contribute  to it, and that  the reverse  is true for the rich
regions. Net gains  from the budget  decrease  as income  increases.
3.16  Such transfers can take place, even with a regressive tax system and regressive
expenditure  system  (see figure  3.2 below).
Figure  3.2.  Transfers  Induced  by a Doubly  Regressive  Budget
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3.17  Empirical  studies  support  this hypothesis. Davezies  (1989)  studied  the contribution  to
and the gains  from the French  national  budget  for 90 d6partements;  Oliveira  (1991)  conducted  the
same  exercise  for 22 Brazilian  states. For Cote  d'lvoire, Thailand,  and  Morocco,  similar  estimates
were mnade  for the contributions  and  the gains  of the metropolitan  area and  of the rest of the country
(Davezies,  Nicot, Prud'honume  1985;  Davezies,  Nicot,  Prud'homme  1987;  Nicot, Letrung, !989).
In spite of the conceptual  and statistical  difficulties  of this exercise  (wh.ch were solved by the
multiplication  and  generalization  of sensitivity  analysis),  the results  emphasized  that richer areas  do
subsidize,  through  national  budgets,  poorer areas.
3.18  Table 3.2 summarizes  the magnitude  of these transfers  between  the large cities and  the
rest of the countries  for the five  cases studied.18  On the Dangers  of Decentralization
Table 3.2:  Budget-Induced Transfers  Between Large Cities and the Rest of the Country
(percent)
Abidjan  Bangkok  Casablanca  Sao Paulo  Paris
1984  1987  1982  1985  1985
Share of country  population  18  14  12  12  18
Share  of national  budget
Contribution  to budget  54  41  34  20  26
Gains (benefits)  from budget  25  28  18  14  19
Gains  (flow) from budget  34  35  21  9  21
Transfers  (benefit)  25  13  16  6  7
Transfers  (flow)  18  7  13  12  5
Amount (U.S. $)
Transfers  (benefit)  per capita  200  160  400  90  870
Transfers  (flow)  per capita  160  80  330  160  630
Share of GDP
Transfers  (benefit)  5.3  2.5  6.5  7.4  1.7
Transfers  (flow)  4.2  1.3  5.5  13.9  1.3
3.19  The conclusion  that emerges  from this analytical  and empirical  research  is that national
budgets  nearly  always automatically  reduce interjurisdictional  disparities. Any reduction  in the
importance of national  budgets relative to subnational  budgets-a  definition  of decentralization-will
therefore  increase  interjurisdictional  disparities,  or, more  precisely,  decrease  the decreasing  impact
of policies  upon disparities.
3.20  Table  3.3 illustrates  this point. Consider  a country  composed  of two regions  A and B
of equal population  and unequal  income. Both central  and local tax systems  are assumed  to be
proportional  to income. Central  government  public  expenditures  (equal  to central  government  taxes)
are assumed to be divided and/or to benefit equally each region.  Local taxes finance local
expenditures.  In a first case, the  central  government  is assumed  to be twice  as important  as the local
governments  (in terms  of taxes  and expenditures).  The poorer region  sees  its income  increased  by
10 percent. The income  ratio, which  was  2 before  budget  change,  is reduced  to 1.72. In the second
case, decentralization  has taken  place. The central  government  is now  only half  as important  as the
local  governments.  The poorer region  sees  its income  increased  by only 5 percen.,  and the income
ratio is reduced  to only 1.86.On the  Dangers  of Decentralizasion  19
Table 3.3  Changes Induced by Decentralization,  Hypothetical Example
Region  A  Region  B  Country
Irncome  per capita  100  200  150
Public  sector before  decentralization
Central taxes (20%)  20  40  60
Local  Taxes (10%)  10  20  30
Total taxes (30%)  30  60  90
Central public  expenditures  (1/2)  30  30  60
Local public  expenditures  ()  10  20  30
Total public  expenditures  40  50  90
Gain  +10  -10  0
Gain as share of income  (%)  + 10  -5  0
Public  sector  after  decentralization
Central  taxes (10%)  10  20  30
Local taxes  (20%)  20  40  60
Total taxes (30%)  30  60  90
Central  public  expenditures  (1/2)  15  15  30
Local  public expenditures  (-)  20  40  60
Total public  expenditures  35  55  90
Gain  +5  -5  0
Gain as share of income  (%)  +5  -2.5  0
3.21  A  decentralized system will produce less automatic interju -dictional transfers than a
centralized one.  This mechanism is not only static but also dynamic.  It is likely to start a vicious
circle.  The richer jurisdictions will have larger tax bases (whatever tax bases are chosen).  Their
tax rates will be either equal to the tax rates of other, less rich, jurisdic.ions, or lower.  In the first
case, they will have more tax income and therefore provide more local public services.  In the
second case, they will offer the same service, but with lower tax rates.  In both cases,  these
jurisdictions will be more attractive to households  and enterprises.  Households  and enterprises will
settle preferentially in these jurisdictions, enlarging their tax bases and increasing the gap between
richer and poorer jurisdictions.  Decentralization  will thus foster segregation.  The story of United
States local governments offers an illustration of this disparity-increasing  mechanism.  By contrast,
a  fully centralized system would automatically reduce disparities because of  the redistributive
properties of budgets discussed above.20  On  the  Dangers  of Decentralization
3.22  A corollary is that, all other things being equal, the decentralization  of taxes and
expenditures  (the one discussed  here) works  against  activity  decentralization.  It is likely  to lead to
a concentration  of activities  and growth  in a few  cities  and locations.
3.23  Some cynics could consider this a virtue of decentralization. The concentration  of
activities  is likely to contribute  to growth, then a decentralized  system is likely to be growth
inducing. Cynics would find support for this thesis in the experience  of some  former socialist
countries. In these highly centralized  countries,  where the principle  of the unity of the budget
prevailed,  it was possible  to locate  activities  where planners  found it desirable. In a country  like
Poland,  for instance,  industry  was created  in many  parts of the  country, including  those  parts with
no comparative  advantage. The net result  was a balanced  spatial  development,  coupled  with a low
growth.
3.24  The issue of interjurisdictional  differences  in policies  (particularly  tax policies)  arises,
leading  to interjurisdictional  competition. The various subnational  governments  might be led to
compete  with  each other  to attract  enterprises  by lowering  tax rates  or raising  subsidies. While  some
competition  may be desirable, particularly  if it induces  subnational  governmnents  to become  more
efficient,  too much  competition  may  be destructive.  If subnational  governments  offer enterprises  the
same advantages,  spatial  allocation  will not be modified,  but the balance  between  the public  and
private  sectors  will be modified  away from  an initial  equilibrium  that was suppose-d  to bc optimal.
The greater  the degree  of decentralization,  the  greater  this  possible  misallocation.  There  are possible
solutions  to this  problem. Subnational  governments  can  cooperate,  either  spontaneously  or as a result
of national  government  incentives. And  the national  government  can intervene  to limit  or regulate
interjurisdictional  competition.  Destructive  competition  between  jurisdictions  is  nevertheless  a danger
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4
DECENTRALIZATION  CAN  JEOPARDIZE  STABILrY
4.1  Together  with allocation  and redistribution,  stabilization  is a major function  of public
finance.  It is easv to show that decentralization,  or rather a decentralized  system, nAkes the
exect.tion  of macroeconomic  policies  more  difficult.
Theory
4.2  The two  main  instruments  of macroeconomic  policy  are monetary  policy  and  fiscal  policy.
Fiscal policy (the control of the amount  and structure  of taxes, the control of the ainount and
structure of expenditures,  and '-  control of the budgetary  deficit or  surplus) is a powerful
instrument  to siaiilize  dhe  economy. It is an instrument  that  can only be manipulated  by the central
government.
4.3  Subnational  govet.nments  have little  or no incentives  to undertake  stabilization  policies.
The impact  that a partieul..r  regional  (and a fortiori a local) government  could have on national
global  demand and pr,-  is negligible. Even if the taxing and spending  patterns of a given
subnational  government  could have such an impact,  much of this impact  would be outside the
jurisdiction  of this particular  subnational  government.  Subnational  economies  are much  more open
than  national  ones,  and, therefore,  leakages  associated  with  overspending  or underspending  are great.
A given  subnational  government  would  ha-e to pay the full  political  cost of a policy  that  would  only
bring  in partial  benefits. There  are very important  positive  externalities  associated  with  stabilization
policies  by subnational  governments. As a result, there will never be enough  of it provided  by
regional  and local  governments.  Stabilization  must be conducted  by central  governments.
4.4  For  national govermnents  to  affect overall demand by  manipulating  taxes  and
expenditures,  the  weight  of national  taxes  and  exper.ditures  must  be sufficiently  heavy  relative  to total
taxes  and expenditures  as well as relative  to GDP. In all cases,  a large share  of expenditures  and
taxes  is already  committed  and cannot  be easily  changed,  at least not downwards  for expenditures
or upwards  for taxes. Stabilization  policies  can only be undertaken  at the margin. But  the margin
is a function  of the whole, and if the whole  is small,  the margin  will be very small.
4.5  Consider  a country  in which  total government  spending  represents  30 percent  of GDP.
Assume that the central government  can, for stabilization  purposes, increase  or  decrease its
expenditures  by 10 percent  (a generous  absumption).  Then, in a decentralized  country with local
government  accounting  for 60 percent  of total government  spending,  the central  govermnent  wil be
able to increase  or decrease  total  demand  by about 1.2 percent. In a centralized  country,  with local
govermnent  accounting  for 10  percent  of total  government  spending,  the central  governrnent  margin
of action  will represent  2.7 percent  of GDP. The difference  between  1.2 percent  and 2.7 percent
may  well  be the difference  between  an ineffective  macroeconomic  policy  and an effective  one.22  On the Dangers  of Decentralization
4.6  Furthermore, there is the possibility that the fiscal policies of subnational governments
will run counter to the fiscal policy of the central government. In many countries, local government
policies are influenced by the political cycle: taxes increase immediately after local &lections,  and
expenditures increase immediately before election.  But there is no reason why this political cycle
would coincide with the business cycle.  In practice, local governments  may end up increasing local
public expenditures or local taxes at the time when the central government is trying hard to depress
expenditures or taxes.
4.7  This is what happened in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s.  As the central
government was trying to decrease public expenditures (for structural reasons as much as for
countercyclical reasons), local governments were  increasing them, thus frustrating the central
government efforts.  This was one reason for the introduction  of the ill-fated poll tax in the United
Kingdom, a  tax that would make it politically more difficult for local governments to increase
expenditures.  The opposite is said to have happened in the United States as the time of the Great
Depression, when subnational  governments  ran high budget surpluses,  thereby countering the central
government budget deficit (Perloff, 1985).
Examples
4.8  The case of Argentina  in the 1980s  provides a good illustration  of this 'fiscal perversity"
(Perloff 1985) of subnational governments  kWorld  Bank 1990a). Argentina, a federal country, has
always been decentralized. In the early 1980s, the expenditure  decentralization  ratio was well over
one third (ignoring public enterprises).  Provincial expenditures rose rapidly, reaching over  11.2
percent of GDP in 1986. But revenues  of provincial governments  actually dropped from 5.6 percent
of GDP in 1980 to 5.0 percent of GDP in 1986. As a result, the (pre-transfer) fiscal deficit of the
provinces in 1986 was 6.2 percent of GDP.  This important  deficit was either financed by transfers
from the central government or by borrowing, in both cases inflationary. Transfers were (at least
until 1988) mostly a posteriori discretionary grants from the Ministry of Finance.  This system in
practice fostered provincial mismanagement,  leading to a large central budget deficit.  Borrowing
by the provincial governments from the Central Bank or from provincial Banks (entirely controlled
by the provinicial  governments)  was also a problem.  "These provincial/national  financial practices
have contributed to unsustainable  public sector fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits, and their continuation
would undermine national efforts to attain price stability and to promote sustainable economic
development" (World Bank, 1990a, p.ii).
4.9  The 1988 reform of the Constitution of Brazil significantly  reduced the freedom of the
central government to conduct macroeconomic  policies. Table 4.1 indicates  the share of the central
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Table 4. i:  Central Government  Share of Total Taxes  Before and After 1988 Constitution of Brazil
New
Previous  Constitution  Constitution
Taxes  raised  nationally  100  100
Taxes  raised  by central  government  57  52
Transfers  from  central  to other  government  -27  -30
Share  of national  taxes  left  to central  government  30  22
Source:  Prud'homme  1989,  p.32
4.10  Before the  changes in  the  Constitution, the share  of  taxes  raised by  the central
government  was relatively small (the tax decentralization  ratio was high), and the share of the central
government expenditures was smaller (the expenditure  decentralization  ratio was very high).  This,
however, must be qualified by the fact that the rates of most state taxes were set by the central
government that had a degree of control over the overall fiscal burden (although taxes raised in
Brazil are a function of tax administration-controlled by the States-as  much as a function of tax
rates).
4.11  The  new  Constitution reduces the  ability of  the  central  government  to  conduct
macroeconomic  policies in three ways.  First, it decreases the share of taxes raised by the central
government  (it increases the tax decentralization  ratio), as shown in table 4.1.  Second, it gives more
tax freedom to the states in terms of rate setting, thereby increasing the tax discretion ratio (see
section 1). Third, it increases automatic  transfers from central to subnational  governments, thereby
increasing even further the share of states and municipalities  in total expenditures (the expenditure
decentralization ratio).  As a  result, macroeconomic  policy was made difficult in  Brazil.  The
changes in the Constitution certainly contributed to the poor macro-economic  performances of the
country in recent years.
4.12  The extreme case of  Yugoslavia can also be cited  as  an example (Bogoev  1991).
Yugoslavia, during the 1970s, became one of the most decentralized countries of the world.  In
1986, the central government (the Yugoslav  Federation) accounted  for only 22 percent of total public
revenues.  In addition, central government revenues consisted primarily of sales taxes and custom
duties, a revenue type not appropriate  for stabilization  policies. Furthermore, the central government
revenues  were insufficient  to discharge its responsibilities. It relied upon 'contributions" from lower
levels of government negotiated  each year.  The federal government found it impossible to conduct
stabilization  policies, resulting in high inflation  and poor macroeconomic  management.
4.13  Thus theory and experience suggest that fiscal decentralization  creates problems for a
country's macroeconomic  management.24  On the  Dangers  of Decentralization
5
BEYOND  THE CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION
DICHOTOMY
5.1  This paper has reviewed the issue of centralization versus decentralization  of taxes and
expenditures.  This  is the framework of the literature on fiscal federalism that concludes that
decentralization  is a preferable alternative. This paper argues, however, within this framework that
fiscal decentralization can create difficulties.
5.2  But it can further be argued that this centralization  versus decentralization  framework is
not very meaningful, for two reasons.  First, decentralization  policies are often "predetermined" by
political parameters.  In many countries, a decision to decentralize (or, more seldom) to centralize
is taken for purely political reasons.  In these cases, the problem is not the "how much?" but the
"how to?".  The issue of whether to decentralize becomes a moot one.  Ideas and concepts are
needed that will help make the best of this predetermined level of decentralization  and minimize the
costs of achieving this political objective.
5.3  Second, there are many dimensions of decentralization,  and many forms of governrnent
intervention exist  to which  decentralization can apply.  Some are  more appropriate or  more
desirable-or  less dangerous-than  others.  This section drops the simplicity of the centralization-
decentralization  dichotomy and attempts to explore dimensions  related to the differentiation  between
taxes and expenditures, geographic areas, sectors, and functions, as well as the joint provision of
services.
The Case for a Different Treatment  of Taxes and Expenditures
5.4  The case for a different treatment of taxes and expenditures is presented in the tax
assignment and expeunditure  assignment literature.  The arguments cited in favor of expenditure
decentralization are independent  of the reasons that argue in favor of tax decentralization. There is
no reason why they should lead to similar results.  Many public expenditures (according to this
theory) lend themselves  to decentralization. The optimal  decentralization  ratio in these cases is high.
In contrast, few taxes lend themselves to decentralization  and the optimal tax decentralization  ratio
is low.  Subnational governments are therefore unlikely to have enough tax money to finance their
expenditure, and transfers will be necessary.
5.5  Fiscal  federalists are  uncomfortable with this  case as  it counters the concept that
subnational governments should be self-financing, a  concept at the heart of the justification of
decentralization. For decentralized  decisionmaking  to be efficient, to ensure that the people of each
local government jurisdiction will get the quantity and structure of local public services they want,
they must pay the price attached to the provision of this desired bundle of services. This is not what
happens with fiscal transfers.  If, however, the key issue is the marginal price paid by each local
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for this  theory. As long  as transfers  are given,  providing  an additional  unit of a service  will require
additional  local taxation.  This will ensure the smooth functioning  of the welfare mnximizing
mechanism.
5.6  Rather than elaborating  on these niceties, it might be more fruitful to recognize  that
expenditures  should  be more  decentralized  than  taxes  and that  the  resulting  transfers  can be desirable
and useful. Virtually  everywhere  expenditures  are more  decentralized  than taxes,  and transfers  are
prevalent. A possible  exception  is China (and the former  communist  European  countries)  where
taxes  collected  locally,  at least in the richer areas, are higher than  expenditures  made locally,  and
where transfers  are upward  transfers  rather than downward  transfers. But these locally  collected
taxes  are not really  local taxes  because  their rates  have  been  decided  nationally. Alternatively  local
governmnents  in China are not legitimate  local governments. Therefore  this exception  is more
apparent  than real.
5.7  Transfers  from central  to subnational  governments  are the rule. They  are normnally  large.
both relative  to central  govermnent  expenditure  and to subnational  government  incomne.  In mar,y
countries  they  account  for more  than 10 percent  of central  government  expenditures  and a third of
subnational  government  income. In countries  such  as Italy  or the Netherlands  (with  well  developed
and  reasonably  efficient  local  goverrnents)  transfers  represent  more  than  90 percent  of the resources
of local governments.
5.8  Transfers  should  not be seen  as an unavoidable  evil, but as a welcome  good. They  can
be utilized to  control some of  the dangers of  decentralization. An example is related to
redistribution.  Formulae  utilized  to allocate  block  grants  between  various  subnational  governments
can (and sl,iuld) include  a tax base or an income  component,  so that the poorer areas will receive
less, or much  less, in transfers  than the richer areas.  In this fashion,  the inequality-enhancing  or
"segregative"  consequences  of decentralization  can  be minimized,  or even  reversed. There are such
redistributive  elements in the grants allocation  formulae used in many countries, particularly
developed  countries,  such  as the United  Kingdom,  France,  Germany,  Japan  and Korea. They  should
be introduced  elsewhere.
5.9  Transfers can  also be  designed to  mitigate the  potentially negative impact of
decentralization  stabilization.  The total  amount  of transfers  given  by the central  government  can be
made  proportional  to the total amount  of non-transfers  expenditure. When  the central  government
pursues  an expansionary  (or a restrictive)  policy, this will make it more difficul.  for subnational
governments  to do the opposite. Then, this irnpact  will be increased  if transfers  are of the matching
grant  type,  covering  only a share  of the  local  government  expenditure.  In this  case, a dollar  decrease
(increase) in grants is likely to generate a  greater than a dollar decrease (increase) in local
government  expenditures.  But  there  are limits. First, mnatching  grants  are in general  not  as desirable
as block grants, because  they distort local government  choices  instead  of simply  enlarging  them.
Second,  the total amount  of transfers  should  not be too flexible,  as too much flexibility  makes it
impossible  for subnational  governments  to do serious  planning.
5.10  Can  transfers  be used  to increase  the efficiency  of decentralized  subnational  governments?
Probably  not.  Allocative  efficiency  is achieved  by local governments  choosing  freely between
various expenditures  alternatives. A transfer  system can only limit this freedom  of choice and
therefore  its allocative  efficiency  properties. There is more  hope for production  efficiency. Some26  On the Daigers of Decentralization
transfers can be made conditional upon decentralized  units providing minimal levels of service and
technology.  Other transfers can be utilized to induce decentralized  governments to work jointly to
achieve economies of scale.
5.11  Thus, transfer systems  are an important  component  of any fiscal decentralization  program.
Designing a  good transfer system, however, is a  delicate task because the features which are
desirable to reach certain objectives are not desirable to reach other equally desirable objectives.
Trade-offs must be  identified and compromises arrived at.  This is a promising area for policy
improvements  because in many developing countries transfer systems are often crude.  They have
often developed as a product of administrative  conveniences  or of political pressures and can in many
cases be easily amended at low technical and even political costs.
The Case for a Different Treatment  of Different Geographical Areas
5.12  Most discussions of  decentralization (including the one presented in  the preceding
sections) ignore geography. Decentralization  in India is discussed  with the same concepts and words
as decentralization  in Tunisia; and decentralization  to metropolises  is treated  just like decentralization
to villages.  This is of course absurd.
5.13  Population size matters.  Decentralization is more warranted in a populated country,
where the second level subnational  units are bigger then many small countries.  The same is true of
geographical size.  In a large country likt  Brazil or  Zaire, particularly if communications are
difficult, decentralization is more desirable than in a small country like Jamaica.  The same is true
of  levels of development.  Statistical analysis suggests that decentralization, as conventionally
measured, tends to increase with income levels. Although such correlations  do not reflect underlying
causalities, decentralization success is more likely or "less dangerous" in middle and high income
countries.  "For the lowest income countries, decentralization  may be limited to rhetoric" (Bahl and
Linn 1992, p. 393).
5.14  Large cities should be treated differently from smaller places, even if they have the same
legal status, because they are more able to benefit from decentralization  (Bahl and Linn 1992).
5.15  Simnilarly,  special  quasi  political  government agencies might  be  created  covering
geographic areas to which some function could be decentralized.  A classic exanple  is the French
River Basin Agencies.  For water resource management, France has been divided into six areas,
corresponding  to six major river basin areas. These agencies are quasi-political  bodies, with mostly
locally elected officials on their boards.  They are responsible for both water quantity and water
quality management.  They have quasi-governmental  powers, such as the power to determine the
rates of water consumption  fees and water pollution fees and taxes, and to collect these fees, as well
as the power to spend the incomne  thus generated on water production programs or water treatment
subsidies.  The central government has basically  decentralized its water resource responsibilities  to
these Basin Agencies. They have the appropriate geographic  coverage to internalize  the externalities
associated with water resources management.
5.16  In geographically  differentiated  decentralization,  the key concept is the critical mass. For
decentralized  units to be efficient and achieve  the potential  benefits  of decentralization,  they must be
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by personal training and institution strengthening. But decentralizing taxes and even expenditures
to small and weak local governments  is unlikely to be successful.
5.17  The concept of critical mass also applies to central governments. Decentralization  should
not make them shrink below a certain quantitative and qualitative level.  This level is of course
different from the level required for efficient subnational governments, because the functions to he
performed by central governments  are different. This sets two constraints to decentralization. The
powers transferred from central to local governments should not jeopardize central government
efficiency, and these powers should be transferred to local government that have the critical mass
required to use them effectively.
The Case for a Different Treatment  of Different Sectors
5.18  Different urban or local public services exhibit different characteristics.  The issue has
been explored by Christine Kessides (1992) with regard to privatization.  The author reflects the
characteristics  of the good (its subtractability  and its excludability),  the characteristics of the market
(the existence of monopolies and/or externalities), and the characteristics of the demand (its price
elasticity and its substitutability),  to produce typologies of services meaningful  from the viewpoint
of privatization.  A similar exercise can be conducted to find out which services or sectors would
lend themselves  more easily to decentralization. From this view, three characteristics  are particularly
relevant: (1) the "externality" of the service, (2) its "chargeability", and (3) its "technicity".
5.19  The "externality" of a service refers to the quantity and types of external effects and
geographical spillovers associated with the service.  Some infrastructure services, like highways or
power production and transportation, matter very much outside the area in which the infrastructure
is located or the service provided. This is the case with most network infrastructure, as opposed to
point infrastructures, although a spatially small network (such as a water distribution network) is
really more like a point infrastructure, with a reduced externality.  The smaller the externality of a
service, the easier it is to decentralize it.  By contrast, services with important network effects or
spillovers are not easy targets for decentralization.
5.20  The "chargeability" of a service refers to the ease with which the service can be financed
by charges, as opposed to taxes.  It is widely recognized that services that are excludable and
subtractable can and should be sold (financed  by fees) rather than given for free (financed by taxes).
Services are more or less "chargeable."  Water or power can easily be charged.  Urban public
transport is more difficult to finance by fees only; it is extremely difficult to make people pay for
the amount of garbage collection or of street usage they consume. It should be noted, however, that
technological  progress constantly extends the domain of chargeability. Forty years ago, it appeared
difficult to charge for street usage; electronic road pricing devices are about to make it possible.
Chargeability also has a social dimension.  Some services, like education, which could technically
be  financed by charges, are often financed, at least in part,  by taxes, either  because they are
considered merit goods or because there are externalities  associated  with the provision of the service.
The greater the chargeability of a service, the easier to decentralize.  With few good local taxes,
financing by taxation  will mostly  mean financing  by the central government, which makes it difficult,
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5.21  The  "technicity"  of service  refers  to the degree  of technical  and  managerial  cxpertise
required  to provide  the service.  It Is easier to provide  garbage collection than to provide bulk clean
water.  The lower  the "technicity"  of a service the easier it is to decentralize it.  This is because  the
economies  of scale and  of scope  associated with the provision  of the service,  which are difficult  to
achieve  in the case  of decentralized  provision,  will be less important,  and  therefore  the (potential)
production  efficiency  losses discussed  in section 2 will be minimal.
5.22  In table  5. 1, the externality,  chargeability,  and  technicity  of a number  of  local public
services have been estimated on a scale of 1 to 5, with S the value most favorable to decentralization.
The  values  of  the  three  characteristics  have  been  added  to  yield  a  gross  indicator  of
'decentralizability.  "
Table 5.1:  Decentralizibility  of Selected Local Public Services
&xternality  Chargeability  Technicity  Decentralizibility
(HigA  1,  2,3,4,5  Low)  (Low  1,  23,4 5  Hilh)  (High  1I2,3,4,5  Low)  (Low  3,. .14, 1 High)
Highways  1  1  2  4
Sanitation  2  2  2  6
Railroads  1  4  2  7
Power  production  & transmission  1  5  1  7
Primary  education  3  2  2  7
Rural  roads  2  1  5  8
Telephone  1  5  2  8
Airports  3  4  2  9
Water  production  & storage  2  5  2  9
Ports  4  4  3  11
Garbage  collection  5  1  5  1  1
Power  distribution  4  5  3  12
Urban  transport  4  4  4  12:
Water  distribution  4  5  4  13
S reet cleaning  S  4  5  14
5.23  The concept,  the  rating,  and  the  weighing  formula  in  table  5.1  can  be discussed  and
improved.  This  simple  exercise,  however,  indicates  some  services  are  better  adapted  to
decentralization  than  others  and  why.  Street cleaning,  water  distribution,  urban  transport  (in the
form of provision  or of regulation)  or power distribution  appear the most interesting candidates.  At
the other end of the spectrum are such services as highways,  sanitation, railroads,  power production
or primary  education,  for which decentralization  should be pursued with great caution and prudence,
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The Case for a Different  Treatment of Different  Functions
5.24  'The  provision  of local  public  services  is the outcome  of a complex  set of functions. Six
different  functions  can be distinguished:  (1) the design  of investment,  (2) the choice  of investment,
(3) the construction  of facilities,  (4) the operation  or regulation  of facilities,  (5) the maintenance  of
facilities,  and (6) the monitoring  and auditing  of service  performance. Not all these  functions  are
required  for every  type  of service  and  tasks  are often  interdependent.  But, for a given  public  service
in a given geographical  context,  the desirable  degree  of decentralization  is likely to differ from
function  to function.
5.25  The design  of infrastructure  investments  or facilities  is often  a difficult,  technical  task,
and will be more and more so in a world  of rapid technological  progress. This funtion, which is
often  marked  by important  economies  of scale, cannot  easily  be decentralized  to local goverrnents.
It must either  be contracted  out to private  firms  or remain  a central  government  function.
5.26  The choice of investments  has both a technical  dimension  (what  design to retain), a
geographic  dimension  (where  to locate  the investmnent),  an institutional  dimension  (N,'hat  agency
should  be in charge of it), and a social  dimension  (who  should  benefit). This is the function  most
easily decentralized. If local decisionmaking  can improve  allocative  efficiency,  it is through  the
exercise  of this function. This is where  the detailed,  first-hand,  knowledge  of local realities  (which
will be higher at the decentralized  level than  at the central  level)  can best be applied. This is also
where  the election/reelection  control  mechanism  can be expected  to play  a role,
5.27  The construction  of facilities  function  is probably  not for a government,  be it local or
central, to undertake  directly, and should,  in most cases, be contracted  out to the private sector.
There will nevertheless  always  be a role for government  in this area, either  to construct  on force
account,  or to contract  out the work and supervise  it.  This role would  in many cases  be better
conducted  by a central  government  than by a local government  and is not particularly  suited for
decentralization.  In the case  of road construction,  for instance,  the fragmentation  of technical  staff
and construction  teams can lead to serious  production  efficiency  losses. In practice,  unfortunately,
it is not always  easy to divorce  the allocation  of the construction  of investment  function  from the
allocation  of the choice  of investment  function. But in theory, the decentralization  of the former  is
more  dangerous  than  the decentralization  of the latter.
5.28  The operation  and/or the regulation  of the facility  is often  the most important  function
required  for the provision  of the service. It includes  the setting  of prices and fees. This function
lends  itself  easily  to decentralization.  It cannot  be performed  well  by the central  government,  which
does not have the appropriate  information  or the appropriate  incentive.
5.29  The maintenance  of facilities  should  also be decentralized.  In many  case  it should  be
privatized,  that is, contracted  out to private  enterprises  under  the supervision  of a government.  This
government  can be the central  govermnent,  particularly  when  the central  government  is financing,
but it can also be the local governrnent,  which  will again  have  a comparative  advantage  in terms of
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5.30  A last function is monitoring and auditing.  It is a function best suited for the central
government which has the expertise, the independence, and the elements of comparison that make
monitoring useful.
The Case for the Joint  Provision of Services
5.31  This paper has  focussed on  desirable allocation of different powers or  services or
functions  to the different levels of government. The problem, however, is not to decide which level
of government will be in charge of which local public service and draw up a matrix of services and
level of government and fill it in.  For many, if not most, types of service two or three levels of
government will have to be involved, as different levels of government will have different, but
equally legitimate reasons to be involved.
5.32  Consider the case of primary education.  One can argue that it should be decentralized
to local governments because the needs and the specifics of each local group of pupils are likely to
differ between local communities and could only be recognized and satisfied in a decentralized
system.  But one can also argue that primary education should be a regional responsibility because
of economies of scale in the production of the service (in the production of curricula, or in the
recruitnent of teachers, for instance) and because purely local financing is going to create inequality
in the quality of the service.  Finally, one can also argue that primary education should be a central
government responsibility because the central government has an interest in the education of all its
citizens and because migrations will create externalities and spillovers that must be corrected by a
higher level of government intervention.  All three arguments are strong and convincing.  The
conclusion they suggest is that all three levels of government  must simultaneously  be involved in the
provision of the service.
5.33  The problem therefore is to determine how the different levels of government could and
should cooperate.  There are many instruments  available to this effect, such as: subsidiec  (of many
types), mandates, constraints, guidelines, floors and ceilings,coordination  mechanisms, contracts
signed between various levels of governments. These instruments  should be studied and compared.
Some mechanisms work, others don't.  In the United States, for instance, bridge maintenance is a
state responsibility,  but whenever  a bridge quality goes below a certain threshold, the bridge becomes
eligible for federal money.  This form of central-regional relationship is especially perverse and a
sure recipe to lower the quality of bridges.  Much more is known on certain instruments, such as
grants, than on others, such as mandates.  Coordination is the essence of polyphonic music.  The
part of every instrument must have its own horizontal coherence  and its interest: this is melody. But
at every moment, all instruments  must be vertically coordinated  and synchronized: this is harmony.On  the Dangers  of Decentralization  31
6
CONCLUSION
6.1  This paper has highlighted some of the dangers of decentralization. First, the benefits
of decentralization  in allocative  efficiency are not as obvious as suggested by the standard theory of
fiscal federalism. The assumptions  of this theory are fragile.  Second, these doubtful benefits might
carry a cost in terms of production efficiency, although more empirical research is needed on this
point.  What is not doubtful is that decentralization  runs counter to redistribution  and stabilization.
Third, decentralization makes redistributive policies, whether interpersonal or interjurisdictional,
more difficult, if not impossible. Finally, decentralization  also makes macroeconomic  stabilization
programs more difficult  to implement  because subnational  government  fiscal policies can run counter
to national policies. These are serious drawbacks, or potential drawbacks, that should be taken irto
consideration in the design of any decentralization  program.
6.2  The arguments developed in the analysis  of these dangers can also help understand some
of the real choices. These choices are not so much whether one should decentralize in general, but
rather what functions  of what sectors for what areas can most fruitfully be decentralized. Guidelines
can be provided to that effect.  Furthermore, in many cases, the problem is not so much whether a
certain service should be provided  by a central, regional, or local government since the service has
to be provided with the intervention  of the three levels of government; the real challenge is how to
organize the joint production of the service.
6.3  Decentralization  refers simultaneously  to a state and to a process.  The virtues, and the
dangers, of decentralization  are discussed simultaneously  for both concepts.  This is a dangerous
confusion because decentralization is path-dependent.  What is desirable in a given country at a
certain point in time depends on the present state of decentralization  and the speed at which it has
been reached.
6.4  Much more work, especially empirical work, is needed.  Important are reviews of
decentralization  (or centralization) experiences, especially of experiences encouraged or supported
by the World Bank.32  On the Dangers  of Decentralization
Annex I
A SIMPLE  MODEL  OF BUDGET-INDUCED  TRANSFERS
Consider  a country  with population P,  a GDP of Y, per capita GDP of y, and regions  i.  The
country's budget E is balanced.  Let:
*  ;  be the per  capita taxes paid by  region i to the central  budget,
*  e, be the per capita expenditures  or benefits of the central  budget in region i,
3  gi be the per  capita budget-induced  transfers  for region i,
*  G0  be the budget-induced  transfers  for region i,
Parameters  a,  b, c, describe  the tax and  expenditure  systems,  which are:
. = a  yib  (1)
ei=  c  + d y,  (2)
g=  e  - ti  (3)
Parameter  a  is an indicator  of the budget size.  Parameter  b reflects the progressivity  of the
tax system,  where  b=  1 means  a proportional  tax system;  b>  I a  progressive  one.  Parameter  d
denotes  what  could  be  called  the  'equalizingness"  of  the  expenditure  system;  d=O  ;neans  that
expenditures  per capita  benefit  equally  all regions  and  are independent  of regional  per capita  income;
d <0 that they  decrease  with per capita  income  and  d>0 that they  increase  with per capita  income.
,  (4) 8  Z c  + d yj - a y(
GI = c Pi + d y 1Pi - a yib Pi
E  = a  EY  b PiOn the Dangers  of Decentralization 33
We can substitute  for c in equation  (4) by introducing  the  balanced  budget  constraint  EG,-0:
c  P  +  d  Y  - a  ;  Y b Pi  0
c-  EIP - d y
Equation  4 becomes:
gB - E/P  - a yib  d (y  -y)  (S)
Equation  5 shows  that  the budget-induced  transfers  for region  i are a function  of four factors:
*  The size of the budget  E of the country, which in turn depends  upon a and b, the
parameters  of the tax system  and upon  the regional  income  distribution;
*  The magnitude  of the transfers  also  depends  upon  the progressivity  of the tax system,  as
indicated  by b: for b > I and for higher  values  of y1, a y,l will be large, and the transfer
negative;
*  Transfers are also a  funcdon of  the  "equalizingness'  of  the expenditre  system,
represented  by d,  the slope of the expenditure  curve; if the expenditure  system is
equalizing,  that is if expenditures  are greater  in low income  regions,  then  the lower  the
income  of region  i, the greater  the positive  transfer  it will receive;
e  For a given region i, the transfer is of course also related to its relative per capita
income,  or more  precisely  to the difference  between  its income  and the average  country
income.
This simple  model  can be furtdier  simplified. If the tax system is proportional,  b-I  and
equation  5 becomes:
I  - E  a-  EP  y  - d (y  - y)  (5a)
One can also take the expenditure  system  to be equalization-neutral,  that is independent  of
regional  income. In this case, d=0, and equation  5 becomes:34  On the  Dangers  of Decentralization
g=  E/P - a  yb  (Sb)
One call also consider the two modifications  jointly.  In this case, equation 5 becomes:
gi=  a  (Y - y)  (SC)
*  The model shows that there are only three main avenues to increase spatial transfers in
a given country:
(a) Increase the size of the central budget;
(b) Increase the equalizingness  of budgetary expenditures;
(c) Increase the progressiveness  of taxes.On  the  Dangers  of Decentralization  35
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